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REDUCING WILDFIRE RISK IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN
INTERFACE: POLICY, TRENDS, AND SOLUTIONS
KIMIKO BARRETT, PH.D.*
ABSTRACT
Increasing home development in wildfire-prone areas, coupled with climate
change, are exacerbating wildfire risks to many communities. Better land
use planning can work with other mitigation measures to reduce wildfire
risks to people and homes. There are a variety of land use planning tools
available, such as community plans, regulations, building codes, and incentive-based programs, to better manage development in the wildland-urban
interface (WUI) and other high-wildfire-risk areas. The Community Planning
Assistance for Wildfire (CPAW) program provides communities with resources and services to mitigate wildfire risks through improved land use
planning.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wildfires in 2018 cost an unprecedented $3 billion for federal suppression efforts. 1 In California alone, nearly 20,000 structures were damaged or destroyed,
hundreds of thousands of people were evacuated, and 85 people died as a result of

* Ph.D. Research and Policy Analyst with Headwaters Economics, based in Bozeman, Mont.
Headwaters Economics is a non-profit, independent research organization that works to improve community development and land management decisions.
1. Federal Firefighting Costs (Suppression Only), NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR.,
https://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_documents/SuppCosts.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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wildfires and post-wildfire impacts. 2 Insured losses from California’s historic wildfire seasons in 2017 and 2018 are estimated to exceed $20 billion. 3 Other short and
long-term costs related to ongoing landscape rehabilitation, infrastructure repairs,
degraded ecosystem services, and depreciated property values have yet to be accounted for but will invariably add billions of dollars to the overall costs of recent
wildfires. 4
The rising costs of wildfires have paralleled rising trends in home development
and climate change. Since the 1960s, housing patterns have increasingly favored
areas adjacent to forests, public lands, and the unbuilt environment. 5 More homes
burn and are at risk in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) than in any other land
use type. 6 Drawn by the appeal of scenic amenities and open space, people are
building in the WUI faster than in other parts of the country. 7 From 1990 to 2010,
the WUI grew in terms of both the number of new homes (increasing 41%) and
converted land area (increasing 33%). 8 At the same time, more people are building
in areas with known wildfire history. 9 In 1990, 177,000 homes were located within
the perimeter of a recent wildfire. By 2010, 286,000 homes were located within a
recent wildfire perimeter, corresponding to a growth rate of 62%. 10 In other words,
despite the recognized risks to homes and people, development in wildfire-prone
lands is outpacing growth relative to the rest of the country.

2. Insurance Commissioner Reports Over $9 Billion Insured Losses From Deadly 2018 Wildfires,
CAL. DEP’T OF INS. (Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2018/release142-18.cfm.
3. California Statewide Wildfire Insurance Claims Nearly $12 Billion, CAL. DEP’T OF INS. (Jan. 1,
2018), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2018/release013-18.cfm. According
to Dave Jones, Insurance Commissioner for the State of California, the wildfires of 2017 resulted in 45,000
insurance claims totaling more than $11.79 billion and destroyed 32,000 homes, 4,300 businesses, and
more than 8,200 vehicles and equipment. Id. According to an Insurance Commissioner report released in
December, 2018, insured losses from 2018 were over $9 billion. Combined insured losses from 2017 and
2018 have exceeded $20 billion. A report by Core Logic estimated insured losses from California’s 2018
wildfires will cost as much $19 billion (see The Camp and Woolsey Wildfires in California Cause Devastating
Losses Between $15 Billion and $19 Billion According to Core Logic, CORE LOGIC (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.corelogic.com/news/the-camp-and-woolsey-wildfires-in-california-cause-devastating-lossesbetween-15-billion-and-19-billion-according-to-corelogic.aspx.
4. Kimiko Barrett, The Full Community Costs of Wildfire, HEADWATERS ECON. (May 2018),
https://headwaterseconomics.org/wildfire/homes-risk/full-community-costs-of-wildfire/. Analysis from
this study indicated wildfire suppression costs comprise 9% of total wildfire costs, with other short- and
long-term costs comprising the bulk of wildfire expenses and damages. Id.
5. Volker C. Radeloff et al., Rapid Growth of the U.S. Wildland-Urban Interface Raises Wildfire
NAT’L
ACAD.
SCI.
3314
(2018),
Risk,
115
PROC.
https://www.fs.fed.us/nrs/pubs/jrnl/2018/nrs_2018_radeloff_001.pdf.
6. David E. Calkin et al., How Risk Management Can Prevent Future Wildfire Disasters in the
Wildland-Urban Interface, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 746, 746–51 (2014), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/111/2/746.full.pdf.
7. Radeloff et al., supra note 5, at 3314.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3316.
10. According to Radeloff et al., from 1990 to 2010, 109,000 homes were built in areas burned
by wildfires in the past twenty-five years―an increase of 62% compared to a national growth rate of 29%.
Id.
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In parallel with increasing home development in the WUI are rising trends in
wildfire activity. Exacerbated by changes in the climate—such as warming air temperatures, variable precipitation patterns, decreasing moisture levels, and earlier
snowmelt—wildfires are bigger and lasting longer than in previous years. 11 In generating warmer, drier, and windier environmental conditions, climate change increases the likelihood of extreme wildfire events. Compared to the 1970s, the frequency of large wildfires (>1,000 acres) has increased by 140%; and in the West, the
area burned has grown by nearly 400%. 12 In addition, wildfires are starting earlier
in the spring and burning longer into the fall. 13 Compared to the 1970s, the wildfire
season has been extended by nearly three months, and large wildfires burn more
than seven times longer. 14
Wildfire suppression is widely successful with more than 95% of all wildfires
contained at initial attack. 15 For the most part, wildfires are only a concern when
homes, resources, and people are threatened—a wildfire burning where there is no
development or infrastructure is generally not a concern. 16 However, under extreme wildfire conditions and when a wildfire escapes initial attack, multiple homes
can simultaneously burn and quickly overwhelm firefighting protection efforts. 17
Relatively small ignitions can rapidly escalate into uncontrollable urban conflagrations where suppression is no longer an effective or viable option. 18 We must therefore ask ourselves, are there other options beyond wildfire suppression in preventing a wildfire disaster?
This article argues that better land use planning can work in tandem with suppression efforts and other mitigation measures to reduce wildfire risk to homes and
communities. Within the wildfire management discourse, principles of defensible
space, landscape treatments, and vegetation control are well-known mitigation
11. Anthony LeRoy Westerling, Increasing Western U.S. Forest Wildfire Activity: Sensitivity to
Changes in the Timing of Spring, 371 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC. B. 1, 1 (June 5, 2016), http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/371/1696/20150178.full.pdf; see also John T. Abatzoglou & A. Park Williams, Impact of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire across Western U.S. Forests, 113 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 11770, 11770–75 (2016), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/42/11770.full.pdf.
12. Westerling, supra note 11, at 5–6. The author found a significant trend in the increasing frequency of large forest wildfires since the 1970s in the West, with an average of twenty additional large fires
per decade. Id.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. Westerling found wildfire activity strongly correlated with warming and earlier spring
snowmelt, with the largest fire years occurring in years with warm spring and summer temperatures and
early spring snowmelt dates. Id. Fire seasons between 2003-2012 averaged more than eighty-four days
longer than in 1973-1982. Id. In addition, “the average large wildfire burn time grew from nearly six days in
1973-1982 to nearly twenty days in 1983-1992, nearly thirty-seven days in 1993-2002, and over fifty days
in 2003-2012.” Id.
15. Scott L. Stephens & Lawrence W. Ruth, Federal Forest-Fire Policy in the United States, 15
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 532, 539 (2005), https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1890/040545.
16. See Jack Cohen, The Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Problem, FOREST HIST. TODAY at 20 (Fall
2008), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_other/rmrs_2008_cohen_j002.pdf. In addition to protecting homes
and people, the federal government will suppress wildfires that threaten key environmental resources and
infrastructure such as watersheds and utility lines. Id. at 21.
17. Id. at 22.
18. Id.
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strategies. Research has shown that managing the space immediately surrounding
the home—known as the home ignition zone (HIZ)—can significantly reduce the
potential for a structure to ignite. 19 Viewing wildfire mitigation in the context of
maintaining the HIZ centers responsibility for reducing structure losses and preventing urban conflagrations on the homeowner. 20 There are opportunities for land use
planning to play an enhanced role in wildfire mitigation by requiring homeowners
to implement and maintain HIZ principles to reduce home ignitability. Similarly, land
use planning can equip local governments with the authority and tools to better
manage new and old developments in the WUI and other areas at high risk to wildfires. By regulating where and under what conditions local governments permit development in wildfire-prone lands—including the layout of subdivisions, placement
of roads and infrastructure, and requirement of ignition-resistant building materials—land use planning can direct development to occur safely and responsibly.
The next section provides a brief history of federal policy and response to the
growing wildfire problem in the West. 21 Over time, the federal government has
shifted forest management practices based on current understanding of wildfire
risks. The following section introduces the concept of the wildland-urban interface
(WUI) and describes characteristics defining the WUI as it relates to wildfires. Given
the trajectory of current and projected growth in the WUI, it is imperative that local
governments become more involved in the planning of WUI development to prevent urban conflagrations and disasters. The fourth section of this article describes
a diverse set of land use planning tools to reduce wildfire risks and provides examples of best practices applied in communities. The article concludes with a solutions-oriented approach and describes how the Community Planning Assistance for
Wildfire (CPAW) program is providing local communities with land use assistance
and technical resources to mitigate wildfire risk in the WUI.
II. HISTORY OF WILDFIRE POLICY
Wildfire plays a key role in ecosystem functioning, including the recycling of
nutrients, promoting forest succession, and reducing fuel loads. 22 For centuries, Native Americans used wildfires to modify the landscape for hunting, travel, and cultivation purposes. 23 During the homesteading era of the 1800s, wildfires were used
19. See Jack D. Cohen & Bret W. Butler, Modeling Potential Structure Ignitions from Flame Radiation Exposure with Implications for Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Management, 13 FIRE & FOREST
METEOROLOGY CONF. 81, 81 (1996), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_other/rmrs_1998_cohen_j001.pdf; see
also Steve L. Quarles et al., Home Survival in Wildfire-Prone Areas: Building Materials and Design Considerations, 8393 U.C. DAVIS AGRIC. & NAT. RES. 1, 1 (2010), https://escholarship.org/content/qt4vt8w5qk/qt4vt8w5qk.pdf.
20. Calkin et al., supra note 6, at 746.
21. The West was highlighted in this article because a majority of wildfires burn in this region
compared to the rest of the country, with more than 74 million acres burned since 2000, or 64% of the total
area burned (106 million acres or 92% of the total area burned if Alaska is included). In this context, the
West is considered Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. See, e.g., KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 75700, WILDFIRE STATS. (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10244.pdf.
22. See, e.g., ANDREW C. SCOTT ET AL., FIRE ON EARTH: AN INTRODUCTION (2014).
23. See generally STEPHEN PYNE, AMERICA’S FIRES: A HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
(2010). See also Juli G. Pausas & Jon E. Keeley, A Burning Story: The Role of Fire in the History of Life, 59
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to advance the western migration of European settlers. 24 By burning large swaths
of timber and prairie and through slash-and-burn techniques, land was cleared for
agriculture, development, and railroad construction. 25 Sometimes the intended
fires would burn out of control and result in extensive, and at times deadly, wildfires. For example, in 1871 the Peshtigo Fire in northeastern Wisconsin started from
high winds fanning smaller fires being used to clear timber. 26 Killing more than
1,500 people and burning 1.2 million acres, the Peshtigo Fire remains America’s
worst wildfire tragedy. 27
As more people began moving to the West, the federal government soon recognized the resource value of the region’s vast timbered lands. In 1891, Congress
passed the Forest Reserve Act which set aside forests as part of the public domain,
nominally closing these lands to settlement and resource extraction. 28 Reversing a
tradition of generous land disposal, the Forest Reserve Act set precedent for the
federal protection of public lands and secured government ownership over much
of the lands in the West. 29 To better administer the use and management of the
forest reserves, the National Forest Service was established in 1905. 30 At this time,
the Forest Transfer Act formally shifted control of the forest reserves from the General Land Office in the Department of Interior to the Bureau of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture. 31
That same year, in 1905, Gifford Pinchot was appointed as the first Chief of
the Forest Service; his main concern was to ensure the sustained yield, multiple use,
and protection of the forest resources for local communities. 32 Under Pinchot’s direction, the Forest Service sought to promote the efficient use of natural resources
through coordinated, centrally directed decisions made by forestry professionals. 33
An early focus of this strategy was to protect natural resources from damages
caused by wildfire. 34 To fund these efforts, Congress passed an appropriations bill
in 1908 allowing the Forest Service to request advance funds to cover emergency

BIOSCIENCE 593, 598 (2009), http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1525/bio.2009.59.7.10; Hutch Brown,
Wildland Burning by American Indians in Virginia, 60 FIRE MGMT. TODAY 29 (2000),
https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fsbdev3_000385.pdf.
24. Michael P. Dombeck et al., Wildfire Policy and Public Lands: Integrating Scientific Understanding with Social Concerns Across Landscapes, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 883, 884 (2004), http://fpf.forestry.oregonstate.edu/system/files/Dombeck%20Williams%202004.pdf.
25. Id.
26. STEPHEN PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND RURAL FIRE 206 (1982); see
also Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884.
27. PYNE, supra note 26. See also Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884.
28. JOHN ISE, THE U.S. FOREST POLICY 109 (1920).
29. Glen Robinson, The Forest Service: A Study of Public Land Management 155 (1975).
30. ISE, supra note 28, at 191.
31. Terry West, Forestry Minihistories: Forest Transfer Act of 1905, 90 J. FORESTRY 44 (1992),
https://academic.oup.com/jof/article-abstract/90/6/44/4635580?redirectedFrom=PDF.
32. Id.
33. George Busenberg, Wildfire Management in the US: The Evolution of a Policy Failure, 21 REV.
POL’Y RES. 145, 149 (2004), http://faculty.washington.edu/stevehar/Busenberg2004.pdf.
34. Id.
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firefighting costs. 35 If the agency overspent its budget, Congress would pass supplemental appropriations to cover the deficit. 36 With this provision, the Forest Service
was provided the financial flexibility to pursue aggressive wildfire suppression. 37
The early custom of overspending on firefighting costs would continue to shape administrative practices well into the twenty-first century.
In 1910 the National Forest Service was still a fledgling agency when large
wildfires scorched much of the Northwest. That year, multiple small wildfires burning in Washington, Idaho, and Montana merged into one massive firestorm that
became known as the Great Blowup, or the Great Fires. 38 Sweeping through the
northern Rockies and fueled by especially dry and windy conditions, the Great
Blowup destroyed several towns in its path, including much of Wallace, Idaho. 39
Within 36 hours, 86 people were dead, more than 3 million acres were burned, and
the entire fire protection front was overwhelmed. 40 Smoke from the wildfires was
seen as far away as Boston to the east and 500 miles west into the Pacific Ocean. 41
The wildfires of 1910 contributed to early forest policy and management in
two significant ways. First, the Forest Service was reaffirmed as the government’s
main arm in responding to wildfires. The Great Fires became a defining moment for
the Forest Service. 42 The three Forest Service chiefs following Pinchot were all former firefighters who were personally involved with the Great Fires. 43 Well acquainted with the potential devastation wrought by uncontrolled wildfires, the
chiefs and the agency they led made it their primary mission to extinguish all wildfires upon initial attack. 44 As Chief Forester Henry Graves remarked in 1913, “the
necessity of preventing losses from forest fires requires no discussion. It is the fundamental obligation of the Forest Service and takes precedence over all other duties and activities.” 45
Secondly, the wildfires of 1910 tested the performance and fire protection capacities of the Forest Service. Fighting the wildfires required 10,000 men, most of
the Army reserves based in the Northwest, and a substantial amount of resources. 46
When the wildfires were finally extinguished in late fall, the Forest Service had accrued a $1.1 million deficit and an estimated $25 million in lost timber revenue. 47
Recognizing the need for improved wildfire protection, Congress substantially in-

(2009).

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
See generally STEPHEN PYNE, YEAR OF THE FIRES: THE STORY OF THE GREAT FIRES OF 1910 (2001).
PYNE, supra note 23, at 26.
See generally PYNE, supra note 23.
See generally TIMOTHY EGAN, THE BIG BURN: TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE FIRE THAT SAVED AMERICA

41. John James Little, 1910 Forest Fires in Montana and Idaho: Their Impact on Federal and State
Legislation 75 (1968) (M.A. thesis, University of Montana), https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2474&context=etd.
42. PYNE, supra note 23, at 26–30.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Cohen, supra note 16, at 21.
46. PYNE, supra note 23, at 26. See also Busenberg, supra note 33, at 149.
47. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 149. DAVID E. CONRAD, AM. RES. GRP., LTD, THE LAND WE CARED
FOR...A HISTORY OF THE FOREST SERVICE’S EASTERN REGION 28 (1997).
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creased Forest Service appropriations the following year to provide funding for firefighting and permanent improvements such as transportation routes, communication lines, and lookout towers. 48 An additional $1 million was also appropriated for
“extraordinary emergenc[ies].” 49 Financially backed by Congress and with high public expectations, the Forest Service considered wildfire prevention their priority directive. 50
For the following sixty years, wildfire suppression dominated the federal government’s outlook on forest management. 51 With unforeseeable long-term implications, the zero-tolerance approach toward wildfire significantly altered the structure, density, and composition of the country’s forests. 52 Focused almost exclusively on preventing wildfire damages to natural resources and communities, the
suppression policy neglected to consider the accumulation of hazardous fuels and
forest regeneration. 53 As a result, decades of wildfire suppression created a cyclical
process of fuel buildup leading to larger and more severe wildfires in the longterm—what is referenced today as the “wildfire paradox.” 54
Early legislation further enabled the ubiquitous suppression of wildfires by expanding the administrative reach of the National Forest Service. For instance, the
Weeks Act (1911) and the Clarke-McNary Act (1924) allowed the federal government to work cooperatively with state and private landowners on forest management. 55 By entering into cooperative agreements, the Forest Service provided
states with matching funds for wildfire protection which mainly came in the form
of fire control. 56 Essentially nationalizing the Forest Service’s “no-burn” policy, the
cooperative agreements compelled landowners to suppress any ignitions on their
lands if they were to receive federal funding. 57 Despite critics of the no-burn policy
and research suggesting the long-term benefits of prescribed (light) burning, the
Forest Service’s main agenda of wildfire exclusion persisted well into the postWorld War II era. 58
During the 1930s, the establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC)
provided the manpower and means to implement widespread wildfire suppression. 59 The CCC was broadly deployed to construct the nation’s wildfire protection

48. 1911 DEP’T OF AGRIC. ANN. REP. 15, at 368–72.
49. CONRAD, supra note 47, at 28.
50. Stephens & Ruth, supra note 15, at 533.
51. Id.
52. Geoffrey H. Donovan & Thomas C. Brown, Be Careful What You Wish For: The Legacy of
Smokey Bear, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 73, 73 (2007).
53. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 146–48.
54. Calkin et al., supra note 6, at 747.
55. See generally Lincoln Bramwell, 1911 Weeks Act: The Legislation that Nationalised the US
Forest Service, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 325 (2012); Busenberg, supra note 33, at 151.
56. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 150.
57. PYNE, supra note 23, at 30.
58. Donovan & Brown, supra note 52, at 75.
59. Charles Davis, Western Wildfires: A Policy Perspective, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 115, 117 (2006).
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infrastructure, including trails, roads, communication lines, fuel breaks, and observation posts. 60 The CCC was also organized into firefighting crews and was important in monitoring wildfires igniting in the backcountry. 61 With much of America’s forests now under observation, wildfire suppression soon overshadowed all
other land management options.
Popular opinion regarding extinguishing all wildfires was solidified by the Tillamook Fire in 1933. Burning nearly 300,000 acres, the Tillamook Fire was fueled by
warm temperatures and windy conditions. 62 At the time, it was the largest wildfire
in the Northwest, and its rapid spread across the Oregon forest renewed pressure
on the Forest Service to control wildfires as soon as they started. 63 In response, the
agency adopted a “10 a.m. policy” which sought to extinguish all wildfires by the
following morning. 64 According to the policy, “the National Forest calls for fast, energetic, and thorough suppression of all fires in all locations, during possibly dangerous fire weather . . . . Failing in this effort, the attack each succeeding day will be
planned and executed with the aim, without reservation, of obtaining control before ten o’clock the next morning.” 65
Wildfire prevention came to the forefront of popular culture in 1944 when the
Forest Service unveiled Smokey Bear. One of the most successful public awareness
campaigns ever, Smokey Bear was more recognizable than the President of the
United States at the time. 66 Following World War II, wildfire suppression efforts
were heavily bolstered by the addition of equipment surplus from the war. 67 Applying similar military tactics on wildfires as in combat, wildfire suppression became
mechanized by the use of airplanes, trucks, and tanks. 68 By the late 1940s, America
had some of the most equipped and proficient wildfire protection crews in the
world. 69
Not until the late 1960s did a gradual paradigm shift emerge regarding the
role of wildfire on the landscape. A growing body of literature demonstrated the
ecological benefits of wildfire in revitalizing vegetation, reducing fuels, and preventing future high-intensity wildfires. 70 In 1971, the 10 a.m. policy was slightly
60. Busenberg, supra note 33, at 151; see also LA VAUGHN VANDERBURG KEMNOW, FIRE LOOKOUTS:
CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS (2018).
61. Davis, supra note 59, at 117.
62. Charles I. Dague, The Weather of the Great Tillamook, Oregon, Fire of August 1933, U.S.
WEATHER BUREAU MONTHLY WEATHER REV. at 227 (July 1934), ftp://ftp.library.noaa.gov/docs.lib/htdocs/rescue/mwr/062/mwr-062-07-0227.pdf. For reference to the 300,000 acres burned, see PETER D. A. TEENSMA,
ET AL., BUREAU LAND MGMT., PRELIMINARY RECONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN FOREST STAND AGE CLASSES OF
THE OREGON COAST RANGE FROM 1850 TO 1940 2 (1991).
63. Davis, supra note 59, at 117.
64. Id.
65. JULIE K. GORTE & ROSS W. GORTE, USDA FOREST SERVICE, APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC TECHNIQUES TO
FIRE MANAGEMENT – A STATUS REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1979), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_int/
int_gtr053.pdf; see also Donovan & Brown, supra note 52, at 75.
66. Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884.
67. John W. Chambers, The Evolution of Wildland Fire Management and Policy, 48 FIRE MGMT.
NOTES 5, 5–6 (1987); see also Davis, supra note 59, at 117–18.
68. Chambers, supra note 67, at 5–6.
69. Dombeck et al., supra note 24, at 884.
70. Geoffrey H. Donovan, et al., Incentives and Wildfire Management in the United States, in THE
ECONOMICS OF FOREST DISTURBANCES 323–30 (Thomas Holmes, et al. eds., 2008).
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amended to containing all wildfires to 10-acres or less, and shortly after, the policy
was dismissed entirely. 71 In some national parks, like Sequoia and Yosemite National Parks, natural wildfires were allowed to burn under certain conditions. 72 Under the auspices of “Natural Fire Management Programs,” a let-it-burn policy was
applied to natural wildfires occurring in the wilderness during specific times of the
year. 73
The prescribed natural fire approach soon came under heavy public and political scrutiny. In 1978, the Ouzel Fire was allowed to burn in Rocky Mountain National Park for more than a month before it came dangerously close to a neighboring community. 74 A review of the event later concluded the natural burn fire plan
was not properly implemented and was lacking important ecological knowledge. 75
As a result, prescribed natural burning was temporarily suspended in Rocky Mountain National Park. 76 Ten years later, the Yellowstone Fires of 1988 ushered in a new
era of wildfire awareness. 77 That summer, ten individual fires—both natural and
human-ignited—burned nearly 1.4 million acres in and around Yellowstone National Park. 78 As a result, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior convened a policy review team to evaluate wilderness wildfire policies. 79 Although the review team
reaffirmed the value of wildfire, they encouraged more accountability and interagency cooperation in wildfire response. 80 Pending the approval of new wildfire
plans, all prescribed natural burning was suspended in national parks and wilderness areas. 81
In 1994, Colorado’s South Canyon Fire triggered another joint review of wildfire policy. Although suppression action was taken two days after ignition, the wildfire eventually killed fourteen firefighters. 82 As an outcome of the South Canyon
incident, Congress launched a comprehensive review and update of federal
wildland fire policy, the first in decades. 83 In 1995, the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review recognized wildfire was part of a larger problem and considered the role humans were playing in influencing wildfire behavior. 84
The report prioritized the protection of firefighters, public safety, resources, and
community while also acknowledging there was a place for nature to take its

(2007).

71.
72.

Id.
Jan W. van Wagtendonk, The History and Evolution of Wildland Fire Use, 3 FIRE ECOLOGY 3, 4

73. Donovan et al., supra note 70, at 326.
74. Wagtendonk, supra note 72, at 8.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Wagtendonk, supra note 72, at 8.
81. Id. at 8–9.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id.
84. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR ET AL., REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT
POLICY 7–8 (2001), https://www.nifc.gov/PIO_bb/Policy/FederalWildlandFireManagementPolicy_2001.pdf.
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course. 85 Challenges related to previous years of wildfire suppression were integrated into a current understanding of landscape-level resource management and
collaborative landowner decision-making. 86 The report read: “[A]gencies and the
public must change their expectation that all wildfires can be controlled or suppressed. No organization, technology, or equipment can provide absolute protection when unusual fuel build-ups, extreme weather conditions, multiple ignitions,
and extreme fire behavior come together to form a catastrophic event.” 87
The 1995 policy review was also one of the first widely circulated government
documents to identify the challenges associated with wildfires in the wildland-urban interface (WUI). 88 According to the review, the problem with wildfire response
in the WUI involved mixed private and public landownership as well as an increasing
number of homes. 89 Further, public perception of wildfire in the WUI was low despite the high values at risk. 90 The review went on to identify several locally-based
solutions including hazard mitigation and fuels reduction through zoning regulations, federal-state fire protection agreements, improved fire response apparatuses, and involving insurance companies in rating wildfire-prone properties. 91 Recommendations from the 1995 policy review established the guiding principles and
legislative framework for wildfire management over the next twenty years. 92
Following the severe wildfire season of 2000, President Clinton directed the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to develop an improved strategy to manage
and reduce the impacts of wildland fires. 93 The report, entitled Managing the Impacts of Wildfire on Communities and the Environment: A Report to the President in
Response to the Wildfires of 2000, was released in 2001 and was referred to as the
National Fire Plan (NFP). 94 Aligning with the 1995 policy review, the NFP focused on
firefighter safety and ensuring sufficient future resources, forest rehabilitation, suppression, fuels reduction, and rural community assistance. 95 At the same time the
NFP was released, Congress passed the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, PL 106-291, which directed the secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to
coordinate with the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) on a national 10-Year
85. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY AND
PROGRAM REVIEW iii (1995), https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/strategy/documents/foundational/1995_fed_wildland_fire_policy_program_report.pdf [hereinafter 1995 POLICY REVIEW].
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at iv.
88. See id. at 23.
89. Id. at 21–23.
90. Id. at 23.
91. 1995 POLICY REVIEW, supra note 85, at 24.
92. For similar principles outlined in the original 1995 policy, see U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T
OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (2014), https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/strategy/strategy/CSPhaseIIINationalStrategyApr2014.pdf.
93. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MANAGING THE IMPACT OF WILDFIRES ON COMMUNITIES AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE TO THE WILDFIRES OF 2000 1 (2000),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/pmb/owf/upload/2000-Report-to-the-President.pdf.
94. FORESTS & RANGELANDS, WILDLIFE FIRE MANAGEMENT: THE NATIONAL FOREST PLAN 1 (2007),
https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/resources/reports/2007/nfp2007_budget_justification.pdf.
95. Previous Wildland Fire Management Initiatives, FORESTS & RANGELANDS, https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/resources/overview/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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Comprehensive Strategy for implementing the NFP. 96 Both the NFP and the 10-Year
Comprehensive Strategy recognized severe wildland fires and associated suppression costs would increase if alternative methods, like fuels reduction projects, were
not implemented. 97
In 2003 the NFP was augmented with the Healthy Forest Restoration Act
(HFRA) signed by President Bush. 98 The HFRA sought to restore the ecological benefits of wildfires by establishing programs of aggressive thinning, prescribed burning, and replanting to create open conditions in forests. 99 Despite protests from
conservationists, the HFRA expedited the approval of proposed fuels reduction projects and stymied litigation by altering permissible activities regulated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 100 In effect, the HFRA streamlined the environmental review process by trimming down “bureaucratic red tape” and widely
granting fuels reduction projects on public lands. 101
Recognizing suppression costs were consistently depleting the Forest Service
budget, Congress passed the Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhancement (FLAME) Act in 2009. 102 FLAME reconfigured the method for allocating the
Forest Service’s wildfire budget to better reflect recent trends in wildfire costs. 103
Until then, the allocation of the agency’s budget was based on an ineffective and
disruptive system of a rolling ten-year average. 104 Under this model, the Forest Service requested funds for their upcoming season based on the average wildfire costs
for the previous ten years. 105 Under the new legislation, future suppression funding
was calculated based on the most recent data and methods from the previous
year. 106

96. Toddi A. Steelman & Caitlin A. Burke, Is Wildfire Policy in the U.S. Sustainable?, 33 J. FORESTRY
67, 68 (2007).
97. Stephens & Ruth, supra note 15, at 534.
98. Cathy Whitlock, Forests, Fires and Climate, 432 NATURE 28 (2004), https://www.nature.com/articles/432028a.
99. Id.
100. Charles Davis, Western Wildfires: A Policy Perspective, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 115, 124 (2006).
101. Toddi A. Steelman & Melissa Elefante DuMond, Serving the Common Interest in U.S. Forest
Policy: A Case Study of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, 43 ENV’T MGMT. 396, 397 (2009),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs00267-008-9264-6.pdf.
102. The Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhancement (FLAME) Act of 2009 Report to
Congress 3 (2009), https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/strategy/reports/2_ReportToCongress03172011.pdf.
103. Caitlyn Pollihan & Cecilia Clavet, Briefing Paper on the Federal Land Assistance, Management
and Enhancement (FLAME) Act, COUNCIL OF W. STATE FORESTERS 1 (2009), http://www.thewflc.org/news_pdf/344_pdf.pdf.
104. Id.
105. The Rising Costs of Wildfire Operations: Effects on the Forest Service’s Non-Fire Work, U.S.
FOREST SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 3 (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/2015-FireBudget-Report.pdf.
106. Obama Signs Bill to Help Agencies Manage Skyrocketing Wildfire Suppression Costs,
WILDERNESS SOC’Y (Nov. 2, 2009), https://wilderness.org/press-release/obama-signs-bill-help-agencies-manage-skyrocketing-wildfire-suppression-costs.
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To guide the directives outlined in FLAME, a National Cohesive Wildland Fire
Management Strategy (Cohesive Strategy) was developed. 107 Released in 2014, the
Cohesive Strategy took a holistic view of wildfire on the landscape with a mission to
both safely extinguish wildfires when required while allowing others to burn when
no homes, people, or values are threatened. 108 Orienting the approach were the
three themes of restoring resilient landscapes, creating fire-adapted communities,
and improving wildfire response. 109 Coordinated by the Wildland Fire Leadership
Council, recommendations from the Cohesive Strategy continue to inform current
federal wildfire policy.
At the time, the Cohesive Strategy was one of the most comprehensive efforts
to address the seemingly insurmountable task of abating wildfire suppression costs
while also protecting communities from escalating wildfire risks. By 2017, federal
wildfire suppression appropriations were more than $2 billion a year—more than
six times the average amount spent on suppression activities during the 1990s. 110
At this rate, estimated wildfire suppression costs would consume nearly 70% of the
Forest Service budget by 2021. 111 Traditionally, a shortfall in the Forest Service
budget required “borrowing” funds from other land management programs. 112 During severe wildfire seasons, wildfire borrowing drained agency budgets and compromised important outdoor and recreational services such as watershed management, infrastructure repairs, and forest treatment projects. 113
To end the cycle of deficit spending and wildfire borrowing, a massive appropriations bill was passed in 2018. 114 Captured as a provision in the omnibus bill, the
“wildfire fix” treats wildfires similar to other natural disasters and establishes a reserve fund to use during extreme wildfire seasons. Starting in 2020, a wildfire disaster fund of $2.25 billion will be created and gradually added to over the following
ten years. 115 When suppression costs exceed annual appropriations, based on
FY2015 levels, funds can be withdrawn from the reserve budget rather than borrowing from non-fire programs. 116 The spending bill also increases funding for fuelsreduction projects, grants environmental review exemptions for projects meeting

107.

A National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T

OF AGRIC. (2014), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_other/rmrs_2011_usda_fs001.pdf. This National Strategy

was jointly released by the U.S. Department of Interior and Agriculture. The National Strategy was developed over three separate phases, with the final document released in 2014. Id.
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109. GORTE & GORTE, supra note 65.
110. Federal Firefighting Costs, supra note 1.
111. Cecilia Clavet, Wildfire Funding in the Omnibus Bill: What You Need to Know, FIRE ADAPTED
CMTYS. LEARNING NETWORK (April 26, 2018), https://fireadaptednetwork.org/wildfire-funding-omnibus-billneed-know/.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/1625/text.
115. Id.
116. FY2018 Omnibus Appropriations Act: Summary of Appropriations Provisions, U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Year+
2018#AppropriationsforFiscalYear2018-omnibusappropriations.
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categorical exclusion, extends land stewardship programs, and initiates the process
of wildfire risk mapping. 117
The 2018 wildfire fix was widely applauded by non-governmental organizations, industries, and policymakers for stabilizing agency budgets and ending wildfire borrowing. 118 While the new legislation provides the Forest Service with the
financial flexibility to accommodate soaring suppression costs, it reaffirms the government’s prioritization of fire control and the protection of people and homes at
any price. In an era of megafires and increasing volatility in climate, continued reliance on firefighting to suppress wildfires is unsustainable and dangerous. As wildfires continue to grow in size and severity, and as more people build homes in wildfire-prone areas like the WUI, other wildfire mitigation methods will have to supplement suppression efforts to make communities truly fire-adapted.
III. TRENDS IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE
The wildland-urban interface (WUI)—defined as “the area where [structures]
and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped
wildland” 119—is the fastest growing land use type in the conterminous United
States. 120 Often boasting high levels of natural amenities such as forests and open
space, the WUI is appealing for its recreational and scenic opportunities. 121 As a
result, the WUI has experienced consistent residential growth in recent decades
with 25 million more people living there in 2010 compared to 1990. 122 During this
time period, 12.7 million new homes were added—a 33% increase. 123 Despite the
WUI covering less than 10% of the country’s land area, 41% of all new home development occurred there from 1990 to 2010. 124
The growing presence of people in the WUI is a concern because the highest
number of homes burn in the WUI. 125 Structures in the WUI are often dispersed and
occur on relatively large lots. Protecting these homes from wildfire is more difficult
117. H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/1625/text.
118. See, e.g., Kate Irby, Spending Bill That Just Passed Includes Long-Sought Funding Fix for
Fighting Wildfires, IDAHO STATESMAN (March 25, 2018), https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/nationworld/article206781114.html; Secretary Perdue Applauds Fire Funding Fix in Omnibus, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/03/23/secretary-perdue-applaudsfire-funding-fix-omnibus; Gregory Scruggs, Wildfire Funding Fix Will Take ‘A Period of Years’ to Protect U.S.
Forests, REUTERS (March 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fires-forests/wildfire-fundingfix-will-take-a-period-of-years-to-protect-u-s-forests-idUSKBN1H21AT.
119. There are many definitions of the wildland-urban interface. The definition used in this article
comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, as cited by Volker Radeloff et al., The Wildland-Urban InAPPLICATIONS
799
(2005),
terface
in
the
U.S.,
15
ECOLOGICAL
https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/jrnl/2005/nc_2005_radeloff_001.pdf.
120. Sebastián Martinuzzi et al., The 2010 Wildland-Urban Interface of the Conterminous U.S. (Research Map NRS-8), USDA FOREST SERV. N. RES. STATION (2015); Radeloff et al., supra note 119, at 800–05.
121. See Patricia Gude et al., Potential for Future Development on Fire-Prone Lands, 106 J. FORESTRY
198 (2008).
122. Radeloff, supra note 5.
123. Id.
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and costly due to terrain, evacuation procedures, and the amount of resources required. 126 In addition, an increase in the number of people living in the WUI correlates with a rise in the frequency of human-ignited wildfires. 127 Humans are responsible for starting a majority of wildfires, “accounting for 84% of all wildfires and 44%
of total area burned.” 128 In other words, as more people relocate to the WUI and
the number of homes increases, so does the likelihood of more wildfires starting.
More housing in the WUI makes it challenging for the Forest Service and other
state and federal agencies to manage wildfire on nearby public lands. Differences
in perceived wildfire risk, concern over the degradation of natural amenities, and
smoke impacts discourage agencies from allowing natural wildfires to burn and to
reduce fuels through thinning and prescribed management. 129 For example, the
Forest Service manages 193 million acres of land, and 62 to 82 million acres need
forest treatment. 130 In recent years, the agency has treated between three to five
million acres annually or around 5% of the amount of land requiring treatment. 131
Even if treatment efforts increase, climate change is altering historic wildfire regimes and exacerbating extreme wildfire conditions. 132 Unable to keep up with the
pace and scale of increasing wildfire risk, forest treatments alone cannot effectively
mitigate wildfire risk to homes and communities. 133
Coexisting with wildfire requires a cultural shift in public and agency expectations regarding the risks of living in wildfire-prone areas. When wildfires occur in
the WUI, there is tremendous public, media, and political pressure on federal agencies to ensure that wildfires do not harm private property, endanger lives, or
threaten socially valued resources. 134 The persistence of these assumptions places
exceedingly high standards on firefighters and transfers sole responsibility of home
or property protection from the individual to the government. 135 Since the late
1990s, research has shown the value and overall effectiveness of reducing fuels

126. Gude et al., supra note 121.
127. Jennifer Balch et al., Human-Started Wildfires Expand the Fire Niche Across the U.S., PROC.
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130. Marilyn
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134. Scott Stephens et al., U.S. Federal Fire and Forest Policy: Emphasizing Resilience in Dry Forests, 7 ECOLOGICAL SOC’Y AM. 1 (2016), https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/
10.1002/ecs2.1584.
135. See Mark Finney & Jack Cohen, Expectation and Evaluation of Fuel Management Objectives,
29 USDA FOREST SERV. PROCEEDINGS 353, 353–54 (2003), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_p029/
rmrs_p029_351_366.pdf.
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within the home ignition zone (HIZ). 136 The exterior materials of a home and the
design and location of combustible materials within 100 feet of the home greatly
determine a structure’s vulnerability to wildfire. 137 Wildfires spread and quickly become disasters through home-to-home ignitions and by releasing embers (firebrands), which can easily ignite rooftops, decks, and siding. 138 By addressing conditions within the HIZ—such as using ignition-resistant building materials, managing
vegetation, and maintaining defensible space around the home—extreme wildfires
can spread to residential areas without incurring a WUI wildfire disaster. 139
Many public education programs have embraced principles of reducing home
ignition potential within the HIZ. Programs such as the Fire Adapted Communities
Network, Firewise, and Ready, Set, Go! work with individual homeowners and local
fire departments to prepare properties for wildfires. 140 Voluntary homeowner education programs are effective in raising awareness of wildfire risks and encourage
homeowners to implement mitigation measures on their homes and properties. 141
Homeowners who participate in wildfire prevention programs can be influential in
encouraging other homeowners and neighbors to similarly protect their properties. 142 Due to their voluntary nature, however, homeowner wildfire prevention
programs lack compulsory mechanisms to obligate aggressive mitigation at the parcel level. 143 Public education programs are therefore one part of the solution but
must be complemented with other wildfire mitigation measures. 144
In summary, two general mitigation-based approaches are customarily used
to address wildfire risk to communities. First, forest treatments, such as thinning
and prescribed burns, mitigate wildfire risks at the landscape-scale. 145 Through forest thinning projects and reintroducing wildfire into the ecosystem, the buildup of
fuels is reduced and the potential for future wildfires is curtailed. 146 Second, public
education programs enhance community awareness and acceptance of wildfire

136. Cohen, supra note 16, at 19.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 17.
139. Cohen, supra note 16, at 19–22. See also Calkin, supra note 6, at 747. Syphard et al. has
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Protection During Wildfires, 23 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 1165 (2014).
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(last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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142. Patricia A. Champ & Hannah Brenkert-Smith, Is Seeing Believing? Perceptions of Wildfire Risk
over Time, 36 RISK ANALYSIS 816, 816–30 (2016).
143. See id. at 819–21.
144. Ray Rasker, Resolving the Increasing Risk from Wildfires in the American West, 6 SOLUTIONS J.
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146. See Schoennagel et al., supra note 132, at 673.
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risks. 147 Through collaboration and outreach among homeowners, fire departments, and agencies, wildfire preparedness programs address wildfire mitigation at
the parcel-scale. 148 When multiple homeowners collectively organize to mitigate
wildfire risks on individual lots, the community as a whole is better protected. 149
Yet there is a third, often overlooked, approach that works at multiple scales to
mitigate wildfire risk: land use planning can reduce wildfire risk by regulating where
and under what conditions development is permitted in wildfire-prone lands.
IV. LAND USE PLANNING TO REDUCE WILDFIRE RISKS
Land use planning can address wildfire risk by considering wildfire impacts in
the design, layout, and placement of proposed developments. 150 In preparing for a
potential wildfire disaster, land use planning applies an anticipatory perspective
and envisions a scenario where wildfires occur alongside communities without resulting in the loss of homes. The land use planning toolkit includes plans, regulations, building codes, incentives, and other development standards addressing wildfire risk at the parcel scale, up to neighborhoods and beyond. In integrating some
of these planning measures into the development process, a community can consider how and where they would like to grow in relation to potential wildfire risks.
A. Community Plans and Policies
A community’s vision for growth is guided by a variety of development plans.
The comprehensive plan, or master plan, provides the foundation for long-term development with other plans providing guidance on specific objectives. Wildfire risk
can be factored into the process of community development through growth policies and strategies identified in the comprehensive plan. Because the comprehensive plan is the political framework for future growth in the community, integrating
wildfire into the document reaffirms the legal basis for protecting community assets, values, and resources from wildfire impacts. For example, Boulder County, Colorado’s comprehensive plan was amended in 2017 and dedicates an entire section
of the natural hazards chapter to wildfires. 151 While the document acknowledges
the importance and environmental benefits of wildfires, it also outlines several policies to minimize impacts to homes and communities. 152 Specifically, the comprehensive plan stipulates that during the review of proposed developments in areas
at high wildfire risk, site elements such as location, building construction and design, landscaping, fuel management, access, and water availability have to be adequately addressed. 153 The comprehensive plan also identifies the need to educate
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the public and homeowners about wildfires, including accepting wildfires as an essential and natural process, and using forest treatments and prescribed burns to
manage fuel buildup. 154
Implementation of the wildfire protection policies outlined in Boulder
County’s comprehensive plan are addressed through the land use code. 155 Within
the land use code, a set of regulations require that certain development standards
are satisfied prior to approval of proposed homes and subdivisions. 156 The review
process requires that proposed development and site plans be submitted to the
county planning department. 157 At this time, the county is allowed to impose additional conditions for wildfire mitigation, such as potential site relocation, maintained defensible space, guaranteed water supply, and constructed pullouts and
turn-arounds for long driveways. 158 Any mitigation conditions placed on a site plan
review are subsequently placed on the building permit. 159 Completed developments are inspected and verified to have fulfilled required wildfire mitigation
measures. 160
A Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) is a planning document addressing wildfire risk, and is built on the values of public safety and community welfare outlined in the Comprehensive Plan. 161 Authorized by the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA 2003), CWPPs must contain three elements: (1) partnerships
among agencies, public organizations, and private citizens; (2) identification of fuel
treatments to mitigate hazardous fuels; and (3) recommended strategies to reduce
the ignitability of structures. 162 Developing a CWPP provides a unique opportunity
for collaboration among a broad range of stakeholders and catalyzes discussion
around shared wildfire concerns. Communities that successfully complete CWPPs
are eligible for federal funding to reduce hazardous fuels in their areas. 163
A CWPP also serves as a valuable public outreach tool. For example, Missoula
County, Montana updated its CWPP in 2018. 164 Involving citizens, private organizations, and local, state, federal, and tribal agencies, the CWPP demonstrates Missoula County’s common goal of managing wildfire risk in the WUI, restoring a more
resilient landscape, and learning to live alongside wildfires in the future. 165 The
CWPP identifies areas of high wildfire risk in the community and prioritizes fuel
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treatment locations. 166 An action table is included to guide the implementation process and monitor accountability between different stakeholders. 167 The successful
adoption of Missoula County’s CWPP was a result of strong local partnerships and
political will to organize around community wildfire risk reduction. 168
Although community plans are non-regulatory, they are a demonstration of a
town or city’s intentions for growth, safety, and sustainability. The comprehensive
plan provides the political framework for community growth and guides decisionmaking on wildfire mitigation measures. Requiring forward-thinking principles,
community plans empower communities to protect critical infrastructure, assets,
and resources. In considering wildfire risk within this context, other synergies and
areas of interest are identified, such as preservation of open space, adequate transportation services, ensuring water quality, and protecting other scenic and natural
values.
B. Regulations
Key components identified in the comprehensive plan are implemented
through regulatory tools such as subdivision ordinances, zoning, and building codes.
A variety of regulatory measures allows city and county governments to select options that best reflect site specific wildfire concerns while remaining aligned with
broader community objectives.
Zoning is one of the more robust and common land use planning tools regulating development over time. 169 Zoning stipulates the type of land use permitted
and the intensity of development that occurs within individual districts, such as
commercial, residential, and agricultural. 170 While there are many different types
of zoning districts, an overlay zoning district can be used to mitigate wildfire risk by
identifying and placing additional regulations within an area of special concern. 171
Overlay zones can be applied to ensure public safety is maintained, such as around
airports or floodplains, and to preserve the aesthetic character of a place, such as a
historic building or neighborhood. 172 Specifications within the overlay district often
supersede the existing zoning standards. 173
In Santa Fe, New Mexico, an overlay district applies to the city’s escarpment
zone. 174 The original intent of the overlay zone was to limit future development
along the ridgetops and foothills. 175 More recently, the overlay zone also mitigates
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wildfire risks through enforced home design standards and landscaping requirements. 176 For example, homeowners living in the overlay district are only allowed
to landscape with fire-resistant vegetation, and the city is permitted to routinely
thin trees to reduce potential fuels. 177 To ensure compliance, individual site assessments are conducted by the city’s land use planning department, which works
closely with the local fire department and WUI mitigation specialist on enforcement. 178 The overlay district is also mapped and updated to reflect changes in land
cover, land ownership, and new housing. 179
Subdivision regulations are another land use planning tool to reduce wildfire
risk. 180 By regulating the pattern and layout of new developments, subdivision regulations can mitigate wildfire impacts by requiring multiple accesses, sufficient water supply, vegetation control, and setback distances among other risk-reduction
measures. 181 Fire protection standards can be incorporated into the design of new
subdivision developments, ensuring every home and property is prepared and can
survive a wildfire. 182 For example, subdivision regulations can require clustered development of homes and direct them away from high-wildfire-risk areas and toward
safer low-wildfire-risk areas. 183 While this pattern of land development preserves
open space, it also provides a fuel break and makes evacuation and response easier
for firefighters. 184
In addition, subdivision regulations can specify the type of materials used in
home construction. 185 Also addressed through building codes, the construction and
design of homes in high-wildfire-risk areas can be required to include ignition-resistant building materials. 186 Key components of the home that are traditionally vulnerable to wildfires can be constructed with ignition-resistant materials, including

176 . Id. at 45–46.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 46.
179. Id. at 45.
180. Jack Cohen, Nan Johnson & Lincoln Walther, Saving Homes from Wildfires: Regulating the
Home Ignition Zone, ZONING NEWS 2 (May 2001), http://idahofirewise.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/zoningXnewsXcohen.pdf.
181. Id. at 5.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Clustered developments discourage dispersed housing developments and can redirect
growth away from high wildfire-risk areas, such as the forest boundary, to safer low-wildfire-risk areas.
However, in the case of an urban conflagration and if homes are not built to wildfire-resistant standards,
clustered developments can promote the spread of ignitions from home to home. To effectively reduce
wildfire risks, clustered developments situated near the WUI must also require wildfire mitigation measures
such as defensible space, multiple access, and using wildfire-resistant construction materials. See generally
Alexandra D. Syphard et al., Land Use Planning and Wildfire: Development Policies Influence Future Probability of Housing Loss, PLOSONE 8 (Aug. 2013) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3743760/pdf/pone.0071708.pdf.
184. Open space containing trees, grasses, and shrubs can also provide fuel for a wildfire if the
vegetation is not maintained.
185. Stephen L. Quarles et al., Home Survival in Wildfire-Prone Areas: Building Materials and Design Considerations, 8393 U.C. AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES PUB. 1 (2010), https://anrcatalog.ucanr.edu/pdf/8393.pdf.
186. Id. at 15.
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the roof, decking, windows, doors, and siding. 187 Constructing a home with ignitionresistant building materials is especially important in reducing structure vulnerability to embers, which are responsible for igniting a majority of homes during a wildfire. 188 While higher costs are often cited as a reason for not constructing a home
to ignition-resistant standards, recent studies suggest these costs are not as prohibitive as commonly thought. 189 Ignition-resistant home construction can greatly increase home survivability during a wildfire.
C. Building and WUI Codes
Building codes are regulations that govern the design, construction, and
maintenance of structures. Local jurisdictions commonly adopt model building
codes maintained by the International Code Council (ICC) and then amend the
codes to better fit the needs of the city, county, or state. 190 In 2003, the ICC released
the first International WUI Code (IWUIC) with the aim of mitigating wildfire hazard
to life and property and preventing structure fires from spreading to wildland
fuels. 191 Every three years, IWUIC is updated and amended based on recent wildfire
science and knowledge. 192 The WUI code works with other building and fire codes
as well as public education programs to implement wildfire risk-reduction strategies. 193
In 2008, Flagstaff, Arizona adopted the IWUIC with local amendments. 194
Wildfire risk in Flagstaff is prevalent due to its location amid one of the world’s largest contiguous ponderosa pine forests. 195 For instance, in 2010, the Schultz Fire devastated the community and resulted in suppression and post-fire costs totaling
more than $130 million. 196 Consequently, city residents and staff are keenly aware
of wildfire impacts, and several collaborative partnerships and projects focus on
187. Id.
188. See Alexander Maranghides et al., A Case Study of a Community Affected by the Witch and
Guejito Fires, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. 18 (2009), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/technicalnotes/nist.tn.1796.pdf.
189. See Trent Penman et al., How Much Does It Cost Residents to Prepare Their Property for Wildfire? 16 INT’L J. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 88, 90 (2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420915300893. In a forthcoming study by Headwaters Economics and the Insurance Institute
for Business and Home Safety (IBHS), building material costs for wildfire-resistant products in the roof, exterior walls, deck, and near-home landscaping did not increase the overall costs of new home construction.
The Full Community Costs of Wildfire, HEADWATERS ECON. 1 (2018), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wpcontent/uploads/full-wildfire-costs-report.pdf.
190. 2015 International Wildland-Urban Interface Code Preface, INT’L CODE COUNCIL,
https://codes.iccsafe.org/public/document/IWUIC2015/preface (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) [hereinafter
IWUIC Preface].
191. Id. A report by the National Institute of Building Sciences determined adoption of the IWUIC
resulted in a national benefit of $4 for every $1 invested. See Mitigation Saves: Federal Grants Provide $6
Benefit for Each $1 Invested, NAT’L INST. BLDG. SCI. (2017), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nibs.org/resource/resmgr/docs/MS_FactSheets_Set.pdf.
192. IWUIC Preface, supra note 190.
193. Id.
194. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 150, at 31.
195. Id. at 30.
196. Id. at 29. Many of the costs related to the Schultz Fire were due to post-fire flooding, which
resulted in one fatality and more than $60 million in flood mitigation and response. Id.
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wildfire prevention. 197 The process of Flagstaff’s adoption of a WUI code occurred
over eighteen months and involved a wide range of stakeholders including agencies,
researchers, nonprofit organizations, and residents. 198 Due to these extensive outreach efforts and the realization that wildfire mitigation needed to go beyond forest
treatments, the WUI Code was adopted without opposition. 199 The code covers
nearly the entire city of Flagstaff. 200 It regulates the type of building materials used
in home construction and establishes landscaping standards, adequate water supply, and sufficient road access for properties within city limits. 201 Unlike traditional
defensible space parameters limited to 100 feet of the home, Flagstaff’s WUI code
defines defensible space as the entire property. 202 All homeowners are therefore
required to maintain vegetation across the extent of their defensible space. 203 The
local fire department enforces vegetation management requirements outlined in
the WUI code. 204 Additionally, many neighborhood associations incorporate and
enforce the WUI code through the association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions. 205
Similarly, the City of San Diego, California, applies an aggressive brush management policy to reduce hazardous fuels within its WUI. 206 While not explicitly considered a building code, San Diego’s brush management policy is part of the city’s
landscaping code and is supported by both the city’s comprehensive building code
as well as the state’s building code. 207 The purpose of the brush management policy
is to regulate and enforce vegetation management around homes situated along
the city’s nearly 500-mile-long WUI. 208 Containing more than 40,000 parcels, San
Diego’s WUI is one of the highest wildfire-risk areas in the country. 209 Properties in
the city often abut native vegetation and are situated along narrow canyons and

197. Id. at 30.
198. Land Use Planning & Wildfire Forum, CMTY. PLAN. ASSISTANCE FOR WILDFIRE, http://planningforwildfire.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WUI_Regulations_LUPlanning_Wildfire_Forum_201
8.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2019)
199. Id.; see also Paul Summerfelt & Jim Wheeler, Wildland-Urban Interface Code Adoption: How
to Avoid the Agony, FLAGSTAFF FIRE DEP’T., https://www.flagstaff.az.gov/DocumentCenter/View/15342/FFDWUI-Code-Adoption-Process?bidId (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
200. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 150, at 31.
201. Id.
202. Emery Cowan, Flagstaff Code Helps Fortify Structures Against Wildfire, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (June
26, 2018), https://azdailysun.com/news/local/flagstaff-code-helps-fortify-structures-against-wildfire/article_c52b063c-3792-541e-98fb-30287f4c472e.html.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 150, at 36.
207. Id. at 38. In 2005, California’s Building Standards Commission adopted Chapter 7A which applies to homes in very high wildfire severity zones and regulates materials and construction methods for
reducing wildfire exposure to homes. See CAL. ST. BLDG. CODE § 701A (2016), https://codes.iccsafe.org/public/chapter/content/9997/.
208. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 150, at 36.
209. Id.; GREGORY K. DILLION ET AL., WILDLAND FIRE POTENTIAL: A TOOL FOR ASSESSING WILDFIRE RISK AND
FUELS MANAGEMENT NEEDS 63–71 (modeling outputs); see also Bill Gabbert, Wildfire Activity by County,
WILDFIRETODAY (May 1, 2017), https://wildfiretoday.com/2017/05/01/wildfire-activity-by-county/.
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other open space. 210 Fueled by the Santa Ana winds and dry conditions, wildfires
can rapidly spread across the WUI and into the city. 211
As a result of its extensive wildfire history, 212 San Diego incorporated landscaping regulations into the city’s municipal code to minimize risk to homes and
properties. The landscaping regulations have multiple objectives, including mitigating erosion on steep slopes, conserving energy, and reducing wildfire risk through
site design and the management of flammable vegetation. 213 The city’s comprehensive brush management regulations apply to any property containing a habitable
structure and native or naturalized vegetation. 214 These properties are required to
control weeds, thin plants, and trim trees within 100 feet of structures. 215 The San
Diego Fire Marshal’s office inspects properties to ensure they are in compliance
with brush management requirements. 216 If an inspection reveals that the property
does not meet the requirements, the landowner is given a seventy-day compliance
notification. 217 After that time, if the property owner still fails to comply, then the
city will hire a private contractor and send the bill to the property owner. 218 “Failure
to pay may result in a lien . . . being placed on the property.” 219
San Diego’s brush management policy has evolved over the years and heavily
relies on homeowner education for implementation. Supported by wildfire hazard
maps and outreach materials, the city stresses the importance of maintaining defensible space within the HIZ. In doing so, homeowner education programs facilitate
understanding and acceptance of land use planning regulations protecting neighborhoods and the community from wildfire risk.
D. Incentives
Land use tools can incentivize local governments and developers to steer new
home construction away from high-wildfire-risk areas and toward low-wildfire-risk
areas. For instance, Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) is a zoning technique redirecting development away from an undesirable or restricted area to a location

210. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 150, at 36.
211. Gary Robbins, Wildfires: The Scourge Known as the Santa Ana Winds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(July 8, 2018), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sd-me-disaster-santana-winds-20180619story.html; Shekar Viswanathan et al., An Analysis of Effects of San Diego Wildfire on Ambient Air Quality,
56 J. AIR & WATER WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 56 (2006), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/
10.1080/10473289.2006.10464439.
212. In 2003, the Cedar Fire burned nearly 275,000 acres, destroyed 2,820 structures and killed
15 people in San Diego County—it remains one of the largest recorded wildfires. Four years later, the Witch
Fire also occurred in San Diego County and burned nearly 200,000 acres, destroyed 1,640 structures, and
left two people dead. See Top 20 Largest California Wildfires, CALFIRE (Sep. 5, 2018),
https://www.fire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/fact_sheets/Top20_Acres.pdf
213. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 142.0401 (2018).
214. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 150, at 38–39; SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE §142.0401 (2018).
215. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 142.0401 (2018).
216. Id.
217. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 150, at 38–39.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 38.
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where development is encouraged. 220 By applying a TDR, landowners sell development rights from their land to a developer or other interested party who uses these
rights to develop another designated location. 221
Closely associated with TDRs are density bonuses. Density bonuses encourage
certain types of development within a site, and in return, the number of homes
allowed to be built in the site is increased. 222 In considering wildfire risks, density
bonuses can be used to promote wildfire-resistant home construction, adequate
ingress and egress, reliable water supply, and defensible-space standards. Density
bonuses also improve evacuation and response procedures by clustering homes together and away from high-wildfire-risk areas. Commonly used to conserve open
space, wildlife habitat, and other sensitive areas, density bonuses can address multiple community objectives together with wildfire risk.
Incentive-based programs that work with individual homeowners to endorse
broader wildfire-risk-reduction measures can reduce vulnerability of an entire
neighborhood. For instance, Community Rating Systems (CRS) are frequently used
to manage and reduce flood risk for homes situated in floodplains. 223 CRS provides
a framework and a variety of technical resources to help participating communities
reduce home damage from floods. 224 Insurance policyholders who successfully perform and implement the flood reduction activities outlined in the CRS receive a discount on their home insurance. 225
Boulder County, Colorado developed the Wildfire Partners program to apply
a similar incentive-based CRS model to wildfire risk reduction. Established in 2014,
Wildfire Partners assists landowners in preparing their home and property for wildfires. 226 As part of the program, a hazard mitigation specialist performs an on-site
assessment of the parcel and develops a personalized report identifying priority
risk-reduction measures. 227 The program also offers financial subsidies to offset the
costs for wildfire mitigation and provides a suite of resources and contacts to facilitate implementation of priority actions. 228 After one year, a follow-up inspection is
220. See generally Ctr. FOR LAND EDUC., PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS (TDR) (2005), https://www.uwsp.edu/cnr-ap/clue/Documents/PlanImplementation/Transfer_of_Development_Rights.pdf
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Density Bonus Model Code Language and Commentary, PLANNING FOR HAZARDS,
https://www.planningforhazards.com/density-bonus-model-code-language-and-commentary (last visited
Mar. 15, 2019); Brian Wolshon & Emile Marchive III, Emergency Planning in the Urban-Wildland Interface:
Subdivision-Level Analysis of Wildfire Evacuations, 133 J. URB. PLAN. & DEV. 73 (2007).
223. See National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System, FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-community-rating-system (last updated Mar. 7,
2019).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Wildfire Partners was established in 2014 as a private-public partnership between individual
homeowners, Boulder County, Colorado Department of Natural Resources, and FEMA. More information
can be found on the Wildfire Partners website. See WILDFIRE PARTNERS, http://www.wildfirepartners.org/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
227. Our Program, WILDFIRE PARTNERS, http://www.wildfirepartners.org/our-program/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2019).
228. Id.
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performed and if the proposed mitigation is completed, the landowner receives a
certificate of compliance that can be submitted to participating insurance companies for a discounted rate on home and property coverage. 229
Incentive-based programs come in a variety of forms and can be customized
to local circumstances. When implemented correctly, incentives offer a cooperative
approach toward wildfire risk reduction and encourage action supporting goals
identified in the comprehensive plan. Incentives rely on homeowner reciprocation
and therefore complement broader public education and outreach efforts around
wildfire risk reduction. When aligned with regulatory tools such as ordinances and
building codes, incentive-based programs reaffirm a community’s commitment to
becoming fire-adapted.
E. Community Planning Assistance for Wildfire
To break the cycle of building and rebuilding in the same wildfire perimeters
and to the same minimal development standards, local governments need additional resources to better plan their WUI. In response, the Community Planning Assistance for Wildfire (CPAW) program was launched in 2014 by Headwaters Economics, a nonprofit organization, and Wildfire Planning International. 230 CPAW
works with the local fire and land use planning departments to jointly address wildfire risk in the community. 231 In partnership with the Forest Service Rocky Mountain
Research Station, and funded by the Forest Service and private foundations, CPAW
provides communities with professional consulting and technical assistance to reduce wildfire risk through improved land use planning. 232 Services and resources
come at no cost to the communities. 233 As of 2019, thirty communities were participating in the CPAW program. 234 During the course of a year or more, a team of land
use planners, foresters, wildfire risk modelers, researchers, and policy analysts collaborate with local land use planners, fire chiefs, WUI mitigation specialists, and
elected officials to plan for wildfire risk in the community. 235 CPAW assistance includes reviewing key community plans to identify opportunities for wildfire risk mitigation to be integrated into the development process, assessing local wildfire hazard to identify areas of high concern, generating outreach materials and online tools
to educate homeowners about HIZ principles, and providing scientifically-based research products to inform understanding and dialogue on wildfire impacts in the
community. 236 An important part of CPAW also focuses on enhancing local capacity
and knowledge on local wildfire risks. To expand understanding on how land use
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230. Kelly Pohl, Communities Reduce Wildfire Risk Through Land Use Planning, HEADWATERS ECON.
(Nov. 2017), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wildfire/solutions/cpaw-communities-reduce-wildfire-risk/
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planning can reduce wildfire risks to communities, CPAW hosts local workshops,
training opportunities, and peer-to-peer learning events. 237
Given the diversity of WUI geographies and wildfire conditions, CPAW resources are tailored to meet the unique needs of every community—there is no
one-size-fits-all. 238 Engaging with local fire experts and stakeholders on wildfire
risks is therefore essential to the CPAW process and in prioritizing practical and applicable land use planning options for the community. By integrating wildfire mitigation into the initial stages of building review and approval, CPAW emphasizes
wildfire risk reduction from the start of development design through to completion.
V. CONCLUSION
As development grows within wildfire-prone areas and as wildfires increase in
size and severity, we must expand our traditional thinking to envision a future living
alongside wildfires. Land use planning offers a unique opportunity to mitigate wildfire risks because it is predicated on a scenario where homes and neighborhoods
are designed to survive a wildfire disaster.
Few communities have the capacity, authority, or political will to implement
rigorous land use planning tools to reduce wildfire risk in the WUI. As suppression
costs are largely paid by federal agencies, there is little incentive or fiscal accountability for local governments to discontinue approving developments in high-wildfire-risk areas. 239
Efforts like CPAW and other programs working with local communities and
homeowners on wildfire mitigation stress the importance of anticipating wildfire
occurrence rather than relying exclusively on wildfire suppression. Wildfires are crucial to ecosystem functionality and in revitalizing forests and landscapes. Attempting to extinguish all wildfires is costly, dangerous, and unrealistic. Homes and communities need to be conceived ahead of time to withstand a wildfire. Application of
land use planning tools is one option for communities to become better fireadapted and resilient in the face of increasing wildfire potential.
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